Minerva of the British Medical Journal (1) ); and because some questions 'ought not to arise'.
Each of these worries deserves careful reflection, especially by those of us who are heavy users of case studies in teaching medical ethics to health care students and professionals. Use of controversial cases undoubtedly needs to be supplemented by analysis of uncontroversial cases, and the use of cases needs to be supplemented by some degree of theoretical analysis -a sort of to and fro process between cases and theory that seeks 'reflective equilibrium' or 'coherence' (2) . And For example, suppose a medical ethics examination in contemporary Britain set the question: 'There is some empirical evidence that fetuses after the first trimester can feel pain. Should abortion methods after the first trimester be modified so as to ensure fetal anaesthesia? Discuss in the context of counterarguments to your own position'. There may be many students who find abortion to be morally repugnant. Ought they to be encouraged to tear up the examination question, or to answer it? Some would argue, against Mr Coope, that the morally appropriate response would be for the student to answer the question, making it clear that he or she disapproves of the practice of abortion -the premise on which the question is based -and indicating why. The student could then either argue why one or other option was morally preferable, given the premise that an abortion was to be done, or alternatively argue why it was morally preferable to defend neither option (for example, because such support might be construed either as implicit collaboration with an evil practice or as a lack of concern for the pain that fetuses might be undergoing). Perhaps the student might add arguments against setting ethics examination questions that presuppose evil practices, or practices that many would regard as evil.
Why might such a response be preferable to tearing up the question and walking out? Because one of the main purposes of medical ethics education is development of the skills of moral reflection and argument in the light of moral positions opposed to the student's own. Such a claim depends on several underlying assumptions. First, that such reflection and argument will lead to better moral outcomes in health care practice. Second, that being able to explain why one has a strong moral revulsion for a particular practice and why one responds in the way one does to that practice is morally preferable to simply having such a moral revulsion and acting on it. Third, that such moral reflection, argument and explanation is more likely to lead to moral development both in the student and in the student's interlocutors (who include the medical ethics teachers), than is mere assertion of moral revulsion and a refusal to discuss cases of which one disapproves.
If such assumptions about medical ethics education are accepted, then similar counterclaims apply to some of Mr Coope's other confidently delivered moral prescriptions about what doctors and students should not discuss by way of case studies. Thus he asserts that 'doctors who are in charge of the weak and vulnerable have a special duty not to so much as dream of harming them, even in the interests of "good causes".' Doesn't it depend on what we mean by harm and how much harm? For example, medical treatments often involve some degree of harm -but we can properly contemplate this in the pursuit of net benefit for the patient. Even if the benefit is for others and not the patient, a very small risk of major harm or a larger probability of minor harm is widely justified in the context of non-therapeutic research, given some stringent safeguards. If But in societies such as our own, in which moral discourse is freely permitted and can be expected to influence political and social life, the toleration and even the promotion of moral intolerance of the sort apparently advocated by Mr Coope may be dangerous, and is more likely to encourage than prevent the development of moral fanaticism and despotism. After tearing up the abortion paper the morally courageous -and fanatical -student may feel encouraged to reach for a gun and shoot the examiner -just as in America morally courageous fanatics may shoot doctors who carry out abortions.
